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2LEGITIMACY AND ECONOMY IN
 DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
Abstract
Deliberative democracy is usually presented as a polity in which legitimacy is
achieved by deliberative participation on the part of those subject to a collective
decision. But cast in these terms, the theory runs headlong into the long-recognized
impossibility of directly involving more than a few members of any large-scale
democracy in decision making. After canvassing the available solutions to this
problem, an argument is made for conceptualizing deliberative democracy in terms of
the contestation of discourses in the public sphere, and public opinion as the
provisional outcome of this contestation as transmitted to the state. Legitimacy is then
achieved to the degree collective outcomes respond to the balance of discourses in the
polity, to the extent this balance is itself subject to dispersed and competent political
control.
1I. THE COMPETING CLAIMS OF LEGITIMACY AND ECONOMY
Deliberative democracy, though the dominant theme in recent democratic
theory, remains on the face of it impossible – at least to the degree it is cast as an
account of democratic legitimacy.  Yet this is how the theory arrived in Joshua
Cohen’s classic formulation, and this is still the claim at the theory’s core: that
outcomes are legitimate to the extent they receive reflective assent through
participation in authentic deliberation by all those subject to the decision in question.1
As Seyla Benhabib puts it, “legitimacy in complex democratic societies must be
thought to result from the free and unconstrained deliberation of all about matters of
common concern” [emphasis added].2 The essence of deliberation is generally taken
to be that claims for or against collective decisions need to be justified to those
subject to these decisions in terms that, given the chance to reflect, these individuals
can accept. But in real-world deliberations all or even very many of those affected do
not appear to participate, thus rendering deliberative democracy vulnerable to
demolition of its legitimacy claims. In the context of the supposedly exemplary case
of health care rationing in Oregon,3 Ian Shapiro asks “why should we attach
legitimacy at all to a deliberative process that involved very few of those whose
health care priorities were actually being discussed?”4
There are ways to fudge the issue; for example, Cohen specifies only that
“outcomes are democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the object of a
free and reasoned agreement among equals”5– could be, rather than actually being.
Casting matters in terms of the universal right, capacity, or opportunity to deliberate,
rather than actual exercise of that right, capacity, or opportunity, makes deliberative
democracy more plausible. So for Bernard Manin, “As political decisions are
characteristically imposed on all, it seems reasonable to seek, as an essential
2condition for legitimacy, the deliberation of all or, more precisely, the right of all to
participate in deliberation”6 [emphasis in original].  However, this sort of qualification
places a major question mark by legitimacy. For surely the theory hangs by a slender
thread if its viability depends crucially on the vast majority always choosing not to
exercise the rights and capacities that are so fundamental to the theory – and whose
exercise is taken by most proponents of deliberative democracy to be what makes for
good citizens to begin with. Relying on mass apathy to make the theory work would
return us to the dark days of the Schumpeterian, elitist models of democracy, that
deliberative democrats are otherwise so keen to reject.7
The key constraint here is one of economy. Robert Dahl and many others have
pointed out that meaningful participation in collective decision by anything more than
a tiny minority is inconceivable in contemporary nation states (and, indeed, in most of
their component units).8 The time demands on participants are simply impossible in
anything beyond a very small scale political unit. As Michael Walzer puts it,
“deliberation is not an activity for the demos… 100 million of them, or even 1 million
or 100,000, can’t plausibly “reason together.””9
Here I will briefly survey and criticize the available solutions to this problem,
and propose a way to think about securing legitimacy while respecting the basic
constraint of deliberative economy.10 This proposal will require close attention to, and
perhaps some re-thinking about, what we actually mean by core concepts of
deliberation, public opinion, legitimacy – and so by democracy. It will specify the
public sphere as the most important location for deliberation, and conceptualize
deliberation itself as a multifaceted interchange or contestation across discourses
within the public sphere. Discursive legitimacy is then secured to the degree that
collective outcomes are responsive to the balance of competing discourses in the
3public sphere, to the extent that this balance is itself subject to dispersed and
competent control.
II. DELIBERATIVE LEGITIMACY AND LARGE SCALE
The extant solutions to the problem presented by large scale are as follows.
These solutions are not mutually exclusive, and can indeed be combined.
First, deliberative democracy can be restricted to a small number of occasions
when popular deliberation can occur. John Rawls believes that extended deliberation
is appropriate only to matters concerning the constitution, and legislation inasmuch as
“basic justice” (equality of opportunity and material distribution) is at issue.11 Yet the
problem of scale remains even on such special occasions. Take, for example, the
recent (1999) referendum in Australia on whether or not to ditch the British monarch
in favor of a (particular model of) a republic. The failure of the republican proposal in
the referendum compared to the overwhelming success of the model in a setting
provided by a deliberative opinion poll (of which more shortly) suggests that this
occasion, at least, was a deliberative failure at the national level – even in a
population of (only) 19 million. The sheer impossibility of involving more than a
handful of members of the population in deliberation remains overwhelming. As we
shall see shortly, Rawls himself sees no problem in restricting deliberation to a well-
qualified handful.
The number of occasions for society-wide deliberation is restricted still further
by  Bruce Ackerman, who argues that the political history of the United States has
seen just three such occasions: the constitutional founding, the Civil War amendments
to the Constitution, and the New Deal.12 But even on these rare great crises of the
4state, it certainly was not a matter of all the people deliberating, however much
deliberative circles may have been widened. And even if these three occasions were
the only three rightful candidates, it would seem odd to rest an account of democratic
legitimacy on events that most citizens may well go through their lives without ever
seeing.
The second solution, perhaps more straightforward than the first, is somehow
to restrict the number of people involved in deliberation, making sure that the
individuals who do participate be in some way representative of those who do not.
There are two main ways of securing representativeness: by popular election, and by
random selection. The former is of course acceptable to those theorists who see
deliberation as an aspect of, rather than substitute for, conventional sorts of
representative democracy.13 But such an easy assimilation to representative
democracy cannot straightforwardly deliver on the legitimacy requirements of
deliberative democrats such as Cohen, Benhabib, and Manin. For to do so, election
campaigns themselves would have potentially to involve the deliberation of all. So the
problem of scale re-appears, only this time in a slightly different location, and a
legitimacy claim cannot be established at one remove simply by appeal to the
electoral process.
Deliberative democracy’s legitimation problems are compounded here to the
degree elections themselves are not exactly deliberative affairs even for those who do
participate in them – deliberation often has to be subordinated to strategy in the
interests of winning. One way to avoid this anti-deliberative aspect of election
campaigns is to select deliberators by lot instead of election – as is done for James
Fishkin’s deliberative opinion polls, for citizen juries, for Dahl’s proposed
“minipopulus”, and for John Burnheim’s proposed “demarchy”.14 Such forums are
5usually constituted on an issue-specific basis, and their role but advisory – though
there is no reason why they could not be decisive, or indeed act as general-purpose
legislatures.
Random sampling of the relevant population followed by deliberation gives a
simulation of what the population as a whole would decide if everyone were allowed
to deliberate.  This simulation may not hold if the deliberation so organized fails to
capture the differentiated character of political interchange  - i.e, the fact that in
reality people encounter each other largely within or across groups, as opposed to an
undifferentiated forum. (Sanders suggests that this means deliberative polls
misrepresent group processes.15)  However, even if we grant the simulation claim, it
does not entirely solve the legitimation problem, because decisions still have to be
justified to those who did not participate. Still, such justification ought to be easier
than for elections – provided that enough of the population could come to understand
the logic of random sampling.  The problem is that it is not easy to see how the
outcome of a deliberative poll could be justified without somehow involving the
population at large in deliberation. Simply televising and publicizing the poll is
insufficient – as perhaps the Australian example indicates, where the majority of those
voting in the referendum chose the opposite of the deliberators’ recommendation.
Another problem that may arise is that deliberative polls and citizen juries normally
require that well-defined boundaries can be drawn around issues.  Sometimes they can
(for example, when it comes to a constitutional question such as the Australian
transition from monarchy to presidency), but for some issues there will be a variety of
important interactions across issues (for example, concerning issues of free trade and
capital mobility, which have major ramifications for environmental affairs and social
justice).
6Non-democratic ways of restricting the number of participants in deliberation
also merit attention. Consider in this light how Rawls specifies deliberative practice in
terms of the exercise of public reason, a standard for the substantive content of
arguments, which have to be framed in terms that can be accepted by all, thus
excluding self-interest and partial perspectives.16 Public reason for Rawls is singular
and universal: its terms are identical for all, and all individuals who exercise it will
reach the same conclusions. Public reason is defined by a body of principles that
people must accept before they enter a political setting, not what they will be
prompted to discover after they have entered the public arena.17 Thus ny reflective
individual can reach the correct conclusions, and so all that is really needed is one
individual to deliberate about its content – an obvious solution to the problem
presented by large scale.  If some people are better able to reflect than others, perhaps
political philosophers and legal theorists, then they should be the ones to whom
society entrusts public reason. This perhaps helps to explain Rawls’s own enthusiasm
for the U.S. Supreme Court.18
Restriction of numbers of deliberators along Rawlsian lines means that public
reason does not have to be tested in political interaction, and there is in fact no reason
why it should be so tested. Political venues for deliberation, be they courts or
legislatures (Rawls’s favorite places), function so as to provide opportunity for
expression; in this light, there is nothing interactive about them that induces proper
public reason. Rawls is a deliberative theorist, but not a deliberative democrat, his
own self-description  notwithstanding.19 The Supreme Court is a deliberative
institution, but not really an interactive one, and most certainly not a democratic one.
The problem of legitimation arises still more acutely for such non-democratic
deliberation than for deliberation on the part of representatives. Institutions such as
7the Supreme Court can only contribute to legitimacy to the extent that the public
accepts that public reason is indeed singular, and that professional experts in the
exercise of public reason do indeed know best.
A third solution to the challenge of deliberative economy is advanced by
Robert Goodin, who wants those who do participate in proceedings to call to mind the
interests of those who do not participate.20  Thus those who cannot or choose not to
participate still have their interests entered into deliberation – but it is  “internal-
individual” deliberation as cogitation, within the minds of those who do participate.
This sort of deliberation resembles Rawlsian public reason, at least inasmuch as
deliberation is seen mainly as a matter of personal cogitation in light of public
concerns, not as a social or interactive process.
This kind of partial substitution of internal-individual deliberation for real
interaction is advocated in a somewhat different context by Robyn Eckersley, whose
concern is with extending deliberation to a “community of the affected” that
encompasses future generations and the nonhuman world.21 Given that there is no
conceivable way that future persons or nonhumans can give literal voice to their
concerns, they can only be made virtually present in deliberations.22 One could also
imagine this sort of presence being used in connection with the extension of
deliberative democracy across national boundaries as proposed by Thompson, who
wants participants in decision making in state structures to be induced to internalize
the interests of those residing in other states. (Thompson himself does not advocate
internal-individual deliberation, but rather representative devices such as a “tribune
for non-citizens”.23)
Goodin’s solution in fact presupposes that we have already restricted the
number of deliberators. Given the criticisms he levels at selection by lot, in contrast
8with the free passage he grants more conventional representation, he appears to have
the latter in mind. But in specifying a key role for “deliberation within”, Goodin
intensifies the legitimation problem for elected representatives. For he is asking
members of the broader public to take it on trust that the deliberators really are calling
to mind and internalizing broader sets of interests. At least in the case of the Supreme
Court a public record (or at least rationalization) of internal-individual deliberation is
supplied, against which members of the public could, if so inclined, check the
justices’ version of public reason against their own. Goodin hints at no such check.
Having surveyed three available solutions to the problem of deliberative
economy, my own view is that it is deliberation on the part of representatives selected
by lot that presents the fewest problems for democratic legitimacy. But even here,
substantial legitimation problems remain when it comes to persuading those who did
not participate that their reflective opinions would in fact be the same as those who
did deliberate, despite likely surface evidence to the contrary.  Reacting to the results
of the recent Australian deliberative poll on monarchy vs. republic, one of the leaders
of the “real republic” faction urging a “no” vote to the model of the republic on offer
dismissed  the deliberative poll as an exercise in “push-polling”.24  There are also
issues of practicality, if we try to assemble such bodies on more than a few issues.
A fourth solution can be discerned in Jürgen Habermas’s “two track” account
of deliberation in the public sphere and in the legislature, designed with contemporary
complex and plural societies in mind25 (unlike his earlier exemplar, the more direct
and personal communication that defined the far simpler early bourgeois public
sphere26). Legitimacy is secured by public acceptance of the procedures through
which law-making achieves responsiveness to public opinion as formed in a broader
public sphere. Public opinion is converted into communicative power as a result of
9the electoral process, then into administrative power via law making. The problem of
deliberative economy is solved because only a small number of legislators needs to
deliberate about the content of law.
In terms of the need to secure legitimacy while respecting the constraint of
economy, the two-track model is inadequate for a number of reasons. First, it is a bit
ambiguous about extra-constitutional agents of influence. There are times when
Habermas remembers the myriad ways public opinion can affect state action without
necessary reference to elections,27 other times when elections are central.28 But he
ignores the fact that public opinion can affect state action without reference to the
legislature. For administration itself is political, sometimes even deliberative and
responsive to public opinion, not necessarily the mechanical servant of the legislature.
Later I will argue that such extra-constitutional influences can be drawn into the
service of legitimacy. Second, Habermas’s stress on elections plays into the hands of
social choice theorists such as William Riker and his followers who argue that the
popular will has no content independent of the voting system used to measure it.29 But
the most serious flaw in the model is its unremitting proceduralism: Habermas gives
no way to determine what the content of public opinion actually is on an issue. As I
have noted, legitimacy for Habermas is secured by public acceptance of procedural
responsiveness, not by the actual responsiveness of pieces of legislation to the
substance of public opinion on an issue. Thus it remains unclear what exactly it is that
particular deliberations in the legislature are supposed to be responsive to (especially
once we recognize that elections cannot easily answer this question). If the answer to
this question is opaque to observers, it will be equally opaque to legislators, and to
actors within the public sphere. I will attempt to remedy these deficiencies.30
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III. DELIBERATION AS THE CONTESTATION OF DISCOURSES
Rather than wrestle further with the issue of legitimation in the context of
these ultimately ineffective responses to the challenge of deliberative economy, let me
suggest that the best way forward here involves detaching the idea of legitimacy from
a head count of (real or imaginary) reflectively consenting individuals. Such a move
might on the face of it seem to involve rejection of both the very idea of legitimation
and of deliberative democracy itself. But on closer inspection all it will prove to
require is thinking in a slightly different direction about the entities that populate the
political world – not all of which need to be reduced to individuals. My approach
builds on a conception of discursive democracy that emphasizes the contestation of
discourses in the public sphere.31
Deliberative democrats influenced by Habermas have long emphasized the
public sphere as perhaps the most important location for deliberative politics.32
Habermas himself now speaks of dispersed “subjectless communication” that
generates public opinion.33 Similarly, Benhabib speaks of an “anonymous public
conversation” in “interlocking and overlapping networks and associations of
deliberation, contestation, and argumentation”.34
In order to give more substance to the idea of diffuse deliberation in the public
sphere than the rather imprecise and intangible formulations of Habermas and
Benhabib, I suggest we recognize that the public sphere is at any time home to
constellations of discourses. A discourse may be defined in un-Habermasian terms as
a shared way of comprehending  the world embedded in language.  In this sense, a
discourse will always feature particular assumptions, judgments, contentions,
dispositions, and capabilities.  These common terms mean that adherents of a given
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discourse will be able to recognize and process sensory inputs into coherent stories or
accounts, which in turn can be shared in intersubjectively meaningful fashion.
Accordingly, any discourse will have at its center a storyline, which may involve
opinions about both facts and values.
Consider, for example, the area of criminal justice, which is currently home to
at least three competing discourses. One treats crime as a matter of rational
calculation on the part of potential lawbreakers; the storyline is one of fully competent
individuals weighing in their minds the expected subjective benefit of the crime
against the probability of being caught and the severity of the punishment. A second
emphasizes instead the circumstances of poverty and deprivation that cause
individuals in desperation to commit criminal acts. A third emphasizes the
psychopathology of criminals. Each discourse has at its heart a different model of the
(criminal) human being, his or her capacity for autonomous agency, and likely
motivations. Each is also entwined with values about what constitutes normal,
criminal and deviant behavior; and about what kind of punishment or treatment is
desirable. Each can be both backed or undermined by empirical studies that are
unlikely to convince adherents of different discourses. Each is entwined with
ideological positions taken by politicians. The content of public policy at any time
and place depends crucially on the relative weight of these discourses.
Other contemporary examples of particularly powerful discourses would
include market liberalism – arguably the dominant policy discourse of our time;
sustainable development, which since the mid-1980s has dominated global
environmental affairs; and various feminisms.
Now, followers of Michel Foucault often treat discourses as power/knowledge
formations that condition – to the extent of imprisoning – human subjects. If so, then,
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it is hard to be a Foucauldian and a deliberative democrat, because deliberation across
discourses is hard to imagine. Still, I think it is useful to begin with a very loosely
Foucauldian conception of discourses while recognizing that reflective choice across
discourses is indeed possible (and this is where deliberation can come in). Foucault
leaned closer to acceptance of this possibility toward the end of his life. Pierre
Bourdieu speaks of a “discursive field” that actors, who may be in opposition to one
another, can occupy.35 The contours of this field limit the positions that actors can
take, but the structure of the field is itself a result of their actions, interactions, and
contestations. And though they do not use the “discourse” terminology, the notion of
a reflexive modernity as advanced by Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens suggests that
choices across discourses become increasingly possible and likely with the “de-
traditionalization” of society.36 The traditions that can be called into question include
those that once took economic growth and technological change as inevitable and
benign, as well as older traditions of deference and religious authority. Indeed, for
Beck the possibility of such choices becomes the defining feature of modernity proper
(as opposed to the semi-modernity of industrial society).  Which ought to augur well
for the prospects for deliberative democracy.
Elswhere I argue for a conception of discursive democracy in terms of the
contestation of discourses in the public sphere on the grounds that it constitutes the
only effective reply to two sets of critics of deliberation.37 The first set is composed of
social choice theorists inspired by Riker, who argue that the very conditions of
structurelessness favored by deliberative democrats are exactly the conditions most
conducive to arbitrariness, instability, and so manipulation in collective choice.38 This
critique has force so long as deliberation is a prelude to aggregation of opinion,
usually by voting. However, if we re-conceptualize public opinion in terms of the
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provisional outcome of the contestation of discourses as transmitted to the state, the
Riker-inspired critique dissolves. Such transmission from the public sphere can come
about through a number of means. These include the deployment of rhetoric, through
alteration of the terms of political discourse in ways that come to change the
understandings of state actors (as Habermas puts it, “Communicative power is
exercised in the manner of a siege. It influences the premises of judgment and
decision making in the political system without intending to conquer the system
itself.”39), through creating worries about political instability, and sometimes even
through arguments being heard by public officials. In short, there are many non-
electoral and non-voting avenues of influence that by-pass the social choice critique
(in this light, in is hard to see why Habermas becomes so insistent in stressing
elections as the main channel of influence from the public sphere to the state40).
Now, this re-specification of discursive democracy and public opinion is not
the only way to reply to the social choice critique (for example, David Miller argues
that social choice theory highlights some problems which deliberation can solve by
disaggregating the dimensions of collective choice41).  However, it has the benefit of
also responding to a set of critics who arrive from precisely the opposite direction:
difference democrats who charge deliberative democrats with perpetuating an
exclusive gentlemen’s club.42  Where social choice theorists fear unmanageable
diversity, difference democrats see stifling uniformity, under which deliberation is
dominated by well-educated white males well-versed in the niceties of rational
argument.  In this light, seemingly neutral deliberative procedures are systematically
biased precisely because they traffic in unitary notions of public reason.
Taking difference seriously means attending to different identities and the
different kinds of communication that accompany them, refusing to erase them in the
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name of a unitary public reason.  This does not mean that “anything goes” in terms of
the kinds of communication that deliberative democrats ought to welcome, as well as
argument.  Many forms of communication can be welcomed (including gossip, jokes,
performances) provided they are (a) capable of inducing reflection, (b) noncoercive,
and (c) capable of connecting the particular experience of an individual, group, or
category with some more general principle.43
Identity differences should not be allowed to warrant a relativism in which
deliberation is impossible and identities are only asserted dogmatically (as feared, for
example, by William Connolly44). Rather, we should remember that any identity is
tightly bound up with a discourse. The possibility for deliberation is retained to the
extent that reflective interchange is possible across the boundaries of different
discourses – which, I would argue once again, is the defining feature of a reflexive
modernity.
Deliberation as the contestation of discourses in the public sphere remains
faithful to the core idea of deliberative democracy, which, as I noted at the outset, is
that claims on behalf of or opposing collective decisions require justification to those
subject to these decisions in terms that, on reflection, these individuals can accept. At
the same time, conceiving of deliberation as the contestation of discourses enables
effective response to the criticisms levelled by social choice theorists and difference
democrats. Let me now try to make the connection to legitimation in a way that
respects the constraint of deliberative economy.
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IV. DISCURSIVE LEGITIMACY
Let me define discursive legitimacy as being achieved when a collective
decision is consistent with the constellation of discourses present in the public sphere,
in the degree to which this constellation is subject to the reflective control of
competent actors.  This conception accompanies a definition of public opinion as the
provisional outcome of the contestation of discourses in the public sphere as
transmitted to the state (or transnational authority).
Clearly it is impossible for any decision fully to meet the claims of all
competing discourses. That would only be possible if one could envisage consensus in
collective choice, defined as agreement on both a course of action and the reasons for
it.  In a world of competing discourses, one can imagine such consensus only if the
discourses were themselves either merged or dissolved – a prospect that is both
unlikely and undesirable, inasmuch as it would erase the differences that make
deliberation both possible and necessary. The ideal of consensus has long been
rejected by most deliberative democrats, even those sympathetic to the Habermasian
tradition where consensus once played a central role in the counterfactual standard of
the ideal speech situation,45 though their opponents have not always noticed.
Workable agreements (or what Cass Sunstein calls “incompletely theorized
agreements”) in which assent can be secured for courses of action for different
reasons are far more plausible.46 Such agreements will vary in their degree of
resonance with the prevailing constellation of discourses. More resonance means
more discursive legitimacy.
How can this degree of resonance be ascertained? This issue can be unpacked
into three questions. First, what discourses exist? Second, what is their relative
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weight? Third, are collective decisions consistent with this relative weight? The first
question can be answered using empirical discourse analysis; qualitative and
quantitative  methods are available.47 The second question is trickier. One might, for
example, administer a sample survey with items informed by the results of discourse
analysis,48 but that would indicate only the percentage of the citizenry evidencing
support for a discourse, not the depth or political significance of that support. The
third question is easy once the first two have been answered, requiring only an
examination of the content of public policy and other collective outcomes for
consistency with the relative weight of discourses. So, for example, Maarten Hajer
shows that environmental policy in the Netherlands features a disjuncture between a
“Chamber of Concern” dominated by apocalyptic discourse accepting environmental
crisis and a “Chamber of Regulation” where economic feasibility determines the
content of policy.49
The availability of such procedures shows that tangible and measurable
phenomena are at issue. The problem is that as presented they substitute social
science for democratic process, though in this respect they are no worse than ordinary
opinion surveys, and can be seen as just external checks on the operation of
democracy. There is no reason why political actors cannot make corresponding tacit
judgments. Gross violations of consistency at least may be easy to detect (for
example, the imposition of a Poll Tax by Margaret Thatcher’s government in the
United Kingdom in 1990 that met with massive public protest).  But one might say
the same about elections as highlighted in more conventional models of democracy.
Elections can register the massive and obvious in public opinion, but cannot otherwise
represent the popular will (again, as social choice theorists make clear).
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Any possibilities for reasoned agreement resonating with the prevailing
constellation of discourses notwithstanding, there will inevitably be times when
particular discourses lose out in the contest for influence. Those attuned to an
individualistic ontology would probably ask why partisans of losing discourses should
accept outcomes.50 For surely, these individualists would say, we still have to ask this
question, because discourses as supra-individual entities are not in a position to confer
or withdraw legitimacy, because they lack agency. The resonance of discourses with
collective outcomes is something that can be discerned by an observer, but not felt by
discourses – because discourses cannot feel.
It is important here to resist reducing discourses to an individualistic ontology
in such fashion, because though discourses do not possess agency, they do possess the
capacity to underwrite or destabilize collective outcomes – which, from the point of
view of legitimacy, is the most important aspect of agency to begin with.51 This
resistance to reductionism does not mean that reflecting individuals need to be purged
from the account. It is simply to imply that these individuals are not required to pass
competent judgment on every collective outcome to which they are subject (this
would of course run headlong into the economy constraint). They can, however, still
engage the contestation of discourses as they see fit.
Indeed, it is important that such engagement be possible. For particular
discourses might of course be slaves to tradition or religion; or subject to
manipulation by spin doctors, advertisers, and propagandists. Such is the very
antithesis of deliberative democracy. Crucially, then, the constellation of discourses
must itself be open to dispersed and communicatively competent popular control –
which returns us to the idea of a reflexive modernity. (I will return to ways such
control can be exercised shortly.)
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Having established what discursive legitimacy means, all that now remains to
be shown is how it meets the constraint of deliberative economy. To re-state the
challenge: deliberative democracy requires that for a collective decision to be
legitimate, it must be subject to reflective acceptance of those subject to it, who
should be able to participate in deliberation concerning the production of the decision.
But reflective acceptance must be attained in a way that does not impose impossible
burdens on the deliberative capacities of individuals or polity.  As I have noted, the
most plausible existing approaches respond to the challenge by somehow restricting
the number of participants.
The approach I propose here solves the problem because the number of
participants in deliberation is indeterminate.  That is, it does not require any
exclusions – not even exclusions based on not being selected at random for a citizen’s
jury, or not being elected to parliament, or on apathy, or on a choice not to exercise
deliberative citizenship rights.  At any given time, the contestation of discourses can
be engaged by the many or the few, or indeed by none. Typically that number will
fluctuate widely over time for any given issue area; think, for example, of the
upsurges in environmental concern in most developed countries around 1970 and
again around 1990. Such upsurges might lead to dramatic shifts in the prevailing
balance of discourses - which might then remain settled for a while, and receive less
public attention.  Who can engage such contestation? Pretty much everybody; for the
contestation of discourses overlaps with cultural change. Think, for example, of the
life and times of feminism over the past three decades in its contest with patriarchy, or
environmentalism’s rise in a (continuing) contest with industrialism. These discursive
advances cannot just be measured in terms of legislation or policy decisions; but also
in everyday practice, in challenges made and resisted in households, in workplaces, in
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classrooms, and elsewhere (relatedly, Jane Mansbridge speaks of the role of
“everyday talk” in the “deliberative system”52).
This indeterminacy in numbers of participants in the contestation of discourses
solves the seeming incompatible demands of deliberative economy and the need for
collective decisions to secure actual popular reflective acceptance. A Schumpeterian
might argue here that all that has been done is to substitute packages in the form of
discourses for individuals – paralleling the way Schumpeterians substitute the
platforms of competing party elites for the will of the people. But there is a crucial
difference, because Schumpeterians require that ordinary people do no more than
vote, and then sleep between elections. In contrast, discursive contestation can accept,
even welcome, the participation of the many at any time. Moreover, party platforms
are crafted by elites, whereas discourses can be made and re-made by anybody.
My argument does not imply that the deliberative democrat can sit back and
accept society’s prevailing constellation of discourses, their changes over time, and
the many ways in which these discourses can pervade policy making. There are still
insistently critical roles to be played. First, deliberative democrats can expose
occasions where state imperatives (related, for example, to the need to maintain the
confidence of financial markets) override the constellation of discourses in
determining the content of public policy.53 Second, they can expose the degree to
which popular discourses themselves are ideological (in the pejorative sense of
specifying false necessities, perhaps even the necessity of always having to please
financial markets; discourses are inescapably ideological in a more neutral sense of
“ideology”).  Third, they can criticize the degree to which the contestation of
discourses is manipulated by strategy and power and not subject to reflexive control.
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V. NETWORKS AND DEMOCRATIC CONTROL
Democratic theorists can also think about ways in which that contestation can
be subjected to more in the way of dispersed and competent democratic control. Let
me illustrate with just one such way.
The role that networks can play in the public sphere has recently been
investigated by David Schlosberg in a study of the U.S. environmental justice
movement.54  A network begins from the bottom up, and is especially interesting from
the point of view of the contestation of discourses when it brings together actors with
quite different backgrounds. Such is certainly the case for the U.S. environmental
justice movement. This began in 1978 in Love Canal, where working-class whites
were upset at the toxic chemicals found buried beneath their homes – one of whom,
Lois Gibbs, became a key figure in the development of the network. The movement
grew to encompass groups from very different racial, ethnic, and class backgrounds,
and very different kinds of experiences – though of course they share the experience
of exposure and resistance to environmental hazards.  Networks of this sort can also
extend across national boundaries – as is the case for international networks
concerned with, for example, biopiracy, pollution from oil refineries, or landmines.
With the possible  exception of an informational clearing house (the most famous of
which is perhaps the Citizen’s Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste, which in 1997
changed its name to the Center for Health, Environment and Justice), a network does
not have any central organization, still less an organizational hierarchy.
From the point of view of the democratic contestation of discourses in the
public sphere, networks are especially interesting because, to the degree they engage
truly diverse participants, networks just have to work according to principles of
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equality, openness, respect, and reciprocity – the standard deliberative virtues. These
principles do not just happen to describe particular networks; they are necessary for
the network form. There is no centralized hierarchy or leadership promulgating goals,
norms, and strategies to bring diverse participants into line.  The norms that a network
develops can however sometimes be formalized as constitutive principles.55
Networks do engage in discursive contests, but the positions they take grow
out of the experiences of network participants.  For example, the very concept of
environmental justice emerges from what began as a collection of local anti-toxics
struggles. The idea that environmental risks are systematically maldistributed across
lines of race, ethnicity, and class came later, the product of a variety of local but
eventually interconnected experiences. The discourse of environmental justice could
then contest, engage, and change  other kinds of environmentalism – as well as join
them in a larger contest against the discourse of industrialism.
To return to the issue of legitimacy, environmental justice joins other
discourses in pressing claims on collective decisions. It would be an
oversimplification to say that a collective decision in environmental affairs is
legitimate only to the degree of its consistency with the discourse of environmental
justice. As I said earlier, no decision can ever fully meet the claims of all competing
discourses, for consensus is in reality neither possible nor desirable. Workable
agreements that can secure assent for different reasons are more plausible.  Discursive
legitimacy is achieved to the extent of the resonance of such an agreement with the
prevailing constellation of discourses in the degree to which this constellation is
subject to dispersed and competent control – to which networks in the public sphere
can contribute.
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What conditions are conducive to this sort of popular control?  The difficulty
here is that a public sphere is not a formal institution, and so cannot be designed. In
Habermas’s terms it is “a “wild” complex that resists organization as a whole.”56
Networks, in particular, can only arise from the bottom up if they are to have the
discursive qualities I have described. Yet public spheres take shape in relation to other
authority structures that can be designed, or at least reconstituted at the margins.
Foremost among these is the state. The discursive vitality of the public sphere is
facilitated by a state that is passively exclusive in the form of interest representation it
allows.57  The Federal Republic of Germany from the 1950s to the 1980s exemplifies
this sort of state, featuring as it did tripartite corporatism (government, business, and
labor) and a legalistic, unitary conception of the public interest in administration and
law. Social movements flourished precisely because they were excluded from but not
undermined by the state. Actively exclusive states (such as Thatcher’s Britain in the
1980s) undermine the conditions of association in public spheres. Actively inclusive
states (for example, Norway) have no public sphere with any distance from the state.
And passively inclusive states (for example, the United States) convert public spheres
into interest groups (though, as the environmental justice example suggests, such
conversion can be resisted, at least temporarily).
VI. CONCLUSION
Democracy does not have to be a matter of counting heads – even deliberating
heads. Nor does it have to be confined to the formal institutions of state, or the
constitutional surface of political life. Accepting such confinement means accepting a
needlessly thin conception of democracy, and a needlessly tenuous account of
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deliberative legitimacy.  I have argued here that legitimacy can be sought instead in
the resonance of collective decisions with public opinion, defined in terms of the
provisional outcome of the contestation of discourses in the public sphere as
transmitted to the state or other authorities (such as transnational ones). Moreover,
legitimacy can be achieved in a way that meets the basic constraint of deliberative
economy. But we should speak of discursive legitimacy only to the extent that
contestation can be engaged by a broad variety of competent actors. Unlike other
approaches to deliberative legitimacy, in the end it does not matter whether at any one
time the number of such actors is large or small.
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